An Argument

\[ \begin{split} \text{some folks are greedy} \\\ \text{some folks are treacherous} \\\ \textit{therefore} \\\ \text{some folks are greedy and treacherous} \end{split} \]

???

Something has gone wrong here. While it may be the case that some folks are greedy and others are treacherous, there is no reason to think that some are both in the context of this argument. The argument itself gives us no reason to think that some people are both greedy and treacherous. While it may be true that some are both, there is no reason given in the context of the argument to think that some are both.

???

The study of reasoning is called logic. Logicians study arguments. We might be able to understand better what went wrong by generalizing the most important features of the argument. In what follows, we will look at one tool a philosopher can use to determine the validity of an argument, whether an argument gives us any reason to accept the conclusion. If it does, then that argument is valid.

Philosophers often replace semantic features of a proposition, such as the subject (in this case folks, i.e. persons), with letters of the English alphabet, numerals, logical operators, and brackets. We will look at these further down. For now we will look somewhat at categories, another way of generalizing relevant semantic features of a proposition.

One way to understand categories, is as a generalization of a class of thing. The following is one way that logicians, or even philosophers who are not logicians, might look at the above argument:

An Argument Form

\[ \begin{array}{} \text{for all members of a given class of things called persons} \\\ \text{at least one is greedy.} \\\ \text{for all members of a given class of things called persons} \\\ \text{at least one is treacherous.} \\\ \textit{therefore}, \\\ \text{for all members of a given class of things called persons} \\\ \text{at least one is both greedy and treacherous.} \end{array} \]

# Display Markdown:
#input <- system.file("examples/test-md.Rmd", package = "mindr")
# file.show(input)
#input_txt <- readLines("./../day-28-Mon/categorical-syllogisms.Rmd", encoding = "UTF-8")
#markmap(input_txt)
#markmap(input_txt, root = basename(input), md_list = TRUE, md_eq = TRUE,
#md_braces = FALSE, md_bookdown = TRUE)

???

This is the same argument as above, albeit with greater structural rigidity. This added structure will help to better define the subjects of our propositions, greedy and treacherous persons.

As we stated before, the above argument is wrong, it is not valid in that it does not give us any reason to accept the conclusion. Using Venn Diagrams, we can capture why.

First, ‘Class’ here is being represented by labeled circles. We see that there are three classes of things. Persons who are greedy, persons who are treacherous, and persons more generally (later down we can simplify by ignoring the general class of persons).

## (polygon[GRID.polygon.119], polygon[GRID.polygon.120], polygon[GRID.polygon.121], polygon[GRID.polygon.122], text[GRID.text.123], text[GRID.text.124], text[GRID.text.125], text[GRID.text.126], text[GRID.text.127])

Rhetoric and Fiction

???

Often times, it seems to me, that even though a work describes itself as fiction, it still attempts to defend a given argument. For instance, the movie Cider House Rules is like this. It stars Toby McGuire as Homer Wells, a precocious orphan who is taught how to practice medicine (without a license) by the head of the orphanage—Dr. Wilbur Larch. Dr. Larch defends his actions, including terminating pregnancies (illegally since the movie takes place in 1940’s America) and teaching his unlicensed prodigy to do the same by arguing that his patients would seek sub par care elsewhere if he declined. A seminal moment in the movie depicts a young woman impregnated by her father. Although Homer had until then, been reluctant to terminate pregnancies, he acquiesces.

Although the premises in these arguments are more implicit, it is still important that we can clarify them, and I argue formalize them, in order to subject them to the rigors of philosophical critique. The alternative, could be that we are swayed by emotion, rather than intellectual rigor. I would like students to be able to recognize the arguments they might find in fiction, and turn them into more formal arguments.¹

Typically, arguments are made up from a sequence of declarative statements. There are statements that come earlier in the sequence. These are called premises. They are intended to support those that come later in the sequence. These are called conclusions. The final one is the conclusion. Simple structures look like the following argument whose conclusion is that I am mortal:

## (polygon[GRID.polygon.128], polygon[GRID.polygon.129], polygon[GRID.polygon.130], polygon[GRID.polygon.131], text[GRID.text.132], text[GRID.text.133], text[GRID.text.134], text[GRID.text.135])

## (polygon[GRID.polygon.136], polygon[GRID.polygon.137], polygon[GRID.polygon.138], polygon[GRID.polygon.139], text[GRID.text.140], text[GRID.text.141], text[GRID.text.142], text[GRID.text.143])

## (polygon[GRID.polygon.144], polygon[GRID.polygon.145], polygon[GRID.polygon.146], polygon[GRID.polygon.147], text[GRID.text.148], text[GRID.text.149], text[GRID.text.150], text[GRID.text.151])

## (polygon[GRID.polygon.152], polygon[GRID.polygon.153], polygon[GRID.polygon.154], polygon[GRID.polygon.155], polygon[GRID.polygon.156], polygon[GRID.polygon.157], text[GRID.text.158], text[GRID.text.159], text[GRID.text.160], text[GRID.text.161], text[GRID.text.162], text[GRID.text.163])

## (polygon[GRID.polygon.164], polygon[GRID.polygon.165], polygon[GRID.polygon.166], polygon[GRID.polygon.167], polygon[GRID.polygon.168], polygon[GRID.polygon.169], text[GRID.text.170], text[GRID.text.171], text[GRID.text.172], text[GRID.text.173], text[GRID.text.174], text[GRID.text.175], text[GRID.text.176], text[GRID.text.177], text[GRID.text.178], text[GRID.text.179])

More Argument Forms

Material Conditionals and Equivalence

???

There are valid argument forms and invalid argument forms. Often times, the valid argument forms are equivalent with other valid argument forms. A better way of understanding Post Malone’s contribution to Hip Hop, is by looking at one of these equivalency relationships. First however, lets look at another valid argument form.

Modus Ponens is another valid argument form. Instead of beginning with a disjunct however, this valid argument form begins with a material conditional. Rather than either or, what a material conditional says, is that on the assumption that something is the case, then something else follows.

E.g., lets look at a modus ponens argument defending the position that I like sweets. It begins with the material conditional, ‘If I like cake, then I like sweets’.

PAP - What is it?

–

“This principle states that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise.” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 829) (pdf)

• Does Frankfurt accept PAP as true?
• what are some implications of it being true?

–

“Its exact meaning is a subject of controversy, particularly concerning whether someone who accepts it is thereby committed to believing that moral responsibility and determinism are incompatible.” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 829) (pdf)

Section 1

• What is unique about the first kind of situation Frankfurt proposes?

“In seeking illustrations of the principle of alternate possibilities, it is most natural to think of situations in which the same circumstances both bring it about that a person does something and make it impossible for him to avoid doing it” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 830) (pdf)

“or in which some inner compulsion drives him to do what he does.” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 830) (pdf)

???

• Consider Aristotle. Imagine that for your entire life you’ve resorted to getting your way by trickery and illusion. At what point is it  plausible for you to do otherwise? At 10y/o? 30 y/o? 80 y/o?

• But this goes for the virtues as well. Will an individual who has never told a lie be able to do so when they are 100 y/o?

Section II

“It is generally agreed that a person who has been coerced to do something did not do it freely and is not morally responsible for having done it” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 830) (pdf)

“It is natural enough to say of a person who has been coerced to do something that he could not have done otherwise.” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 830) (pdf)

“The fact that a person was coerced to act as he did may entail both that he could not have done otherwise and that he bears no moral responsibility for his action” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 831) (pdf)

“But his lack of moral responsibility is not entailed by his having been unable to do otherwise.” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 831) (pdf)

1. Why?

“Let us suppose that someone is threatened convincingly with a penalty he finds unacceptable and that he then does what is required of him by the issuer of the threa” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 831) (pdf)

“But just what is it about situations of this kind that warrants the judgment that the threatened person is not morally responsible for his act?” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 831) (pdf)

1. Jones has already decided so the threat exerts no  force

“Jones decides for reasons of his own to do something, then someone threatens him with a very harsh penalty (so harsh that any reasonable person would submit to the threat) unless he does precisely that, and Jones does it” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 831) (pdf)

“One possibility is that Jones, is not a reasonable man: he is, rather, a man who does what he has once decided to do no matter what happens next and no matter what the cost.” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 831) (pdf)

“In that case, the threat actually exerted no effective force upon him” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 831) (pdf)

“: if his earlier decision had been to do something else, the threat would not have deterred him in the slightest.” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 831) (pdf)

1. Jones is motivated by the threat but he forgot his own earlier decision (to do what he was threatened to do) but because he was terrified of the threat

“Another possibility is that Jones2 was stampeded by the threat. Given that threat, he would have performed that action regardless of what decision he had already made.” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 832) (pdf)

“In this case, it is not relevant to his having performed the action that he had already decided on his own to perform it.” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 832) (pdf)

“and fear alone led him to act” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 832) (pdf)

“. The fact that at an earlier time Jones2 had decided for his own reasons to act in just that way may be relevant to an evaluation of his character; he may bear full moral responsibility for having made that decision.” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 832) (pdf)

“For he performed the action simply as a result of the coercion to which he was subjected” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 832) (pdf)

1. Jones 3, but his earlier decision already aligns with the demands of the threat but though the threat impresses him, he has already decided to act

“Jones3 was neither stampeded by the threat nor indifferent to it. The threat impressed him, as it would impress any reasonable man, and he would have submitted to it wholeheartedly if he had not already made a decision that coincided with the one demanded of him.” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 832) (pdf)

“When he acted, he was not actually motivated by the threat but solely by the considerations that had originally commended the action to him.” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 832) (pdf)

Section III

“It is not really so certain that it does so, however, because it is unclear whether the example constitutes a genuine instance of coercion.” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 833) (pdf)

“Can we say of Jones3 that he was coerced to do something, when he had already decided on his own to do it and when he did it entirely on the basis of that decision? Or would it be more correct to say that Jones3 was not coerced to do what he did, even though he himself recognized that there was an irresistible force at work in virtue of which he had to do it” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 833) (pdf)

“Our basis for saying this will clearly be that it is incorrect to regard a man as being coerced to do something unless he does it because of the coercive force exerted against him” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 833) (pdf)

“Then we will be bound to admit that being coerced does not exclude being morally responsible” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 833) (pdf)

• As such, just because you were coerced to do some action, does not mean that you are morally exempt from blame for having done that action.

“Whichever we decide to say, then, we will recognize that the doctrine that coercion excludes moral responsibility is not a particularized version of the principle of alternate possibilities” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 833) (pdf)

“Situations in” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 833) (pdf)

“which a person who does something cannot do otherwise because he is subject to coercive power are either not instances of coercion at all, or they are situations in which the person may still be morally responsible for what he does if it is not because of the coercion that he does it” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 834) (pdf)

“When we excuse a person who has been coerced, we do not excuse him because he was unable to do otherwise.” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 834) (pdf)

Section IV

• Why isn’t the case of Jones 3 sufficient to prove PAP false?

“To the extent that the principle of alternate possibilities derives its plausibility from association with the doctrine that coercion excludes moral responsibility, a clear understanding of the latter diminishes the appeal of the former.” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 834) (pdf)

“And yet the threat, since Jones3 performs the action without regard to it, does not reduce his moral responsibility for what he does” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 834) (pdf)

“There is perhaps a sense in which Jones3 cannot do otherwise than perform the action he performs, since he is a reasonable man and the threat he encounters is sufficient to move any reasonable man.” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 834) (pdf)

“His knowledge that he stands to suffer an intolerably harsh penalty does not mean that Jones3, strictly speaking, cannot perform any action but the one he does perform” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 834) (pdf)

“After all it is still open to him, and this is crucial, to defy the threat if he wishes to do so and to accept the penalty his action would bring down upon him.” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 834) (pdf)

“Jones3’s inability to resist the threat does not mean that he cannot do otherwise than perform the action he performs. Hence the case of Jones3 does not constitute an instance contrary to the principle.” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 834) (pdf)

“2 Suppose someone-Black, let us say-wants Jones4 to perform a certain action. Black is prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his way, but he prefers to avoid showing his hand unnecessarily” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 835) (pdf)

“. So he waits until Jones4 is about to make up his mind what to do, and he does nothing unless it is clear to him (Black is an excellent judge of such things) that Jones4 is going to decide to do something other than what he wants him to do.” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 835) (pdf)

“Anyone with a theory concerning what”could have done otherwise” means may answer this question for himself by describing whatever measures he would regard as sufficient to guarantee that, in the relevant sense, Jones4 cannot do otherwis” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 835) (pdf)

(Frankfurt, 1969, p. 835) Not clear how the question is not begged.

“This does, to be sure, suppose that there is some sort of causal relation between Jones4’s state at the time of the twitch and his subsequent states” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 835) (pdf)

“. It would be quite unreasonable to excuse Jones4 for his action, or to withhold the praise to which it would normally entitle him, on the basis of the fact that he could not have done otherwise. This fact played no role at all in leading him to act as he did” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 836) (pdf)

“If he does it on his own, however, his moral responsibility for doing it is not affected by the fact that Black was lurking in the background with sinister intent, since this intent never comes into play” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 836) (pdf)

Section V

“The fact that a person could not have avoided doing something is a sufficient condition of his having done it. But, as some of my examples show, this fact may play no role whatever in the explanation of why he did i” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 836) (pdf)

“. Even though the person was unable to do otherwise, that is to say, it may not be the case that he acted as he did because he could not have done otherwise” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 837) (pdf)

“Whatever it was that actually led the person to do what he did, or that made him do it, would have led him to do it or made him do it even if it had been possible for him to do something else instead.” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 837) (pdf)

“The fact that he could not have done otherwise clearly provides no basis for supposing that he might have done otherwise if he had been able to do so” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 837) (pdf)

“This, then, is why the principle of alternate possibilities is mistaken. It asserts that a person bears no moral responsibility–that is, he is to be excused-for having performed an action if there were circumstances that made it impossible for him to avoid performing it” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 837) (pdf)

“But there may be circumstances that make it impossible for a person to avoid performing some action without those circumstances in any way bringing it about that he performs that actio” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 837) (pdf)

“But this is because we assume that what they tell us serves to explain why they did what they did” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 838) (pdf)

“What I have said may suggest that the principle of alternate possibilities should be revised so as to assert that a person is not morally responsible for what he has done if he did it because he could not have done otherwise.” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 838) (pdf)

“For if it was causally determined that a person perform a certain action, then it will be true that the person performed it because of those causal determinants” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 838) (pdf)

“The revised principle of alternate possibilities will entail, on this assumption concerning the meaning of ‘could have done otherwise’, that a person is not morally responsible for what he has done if it was causally determined that he do it” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 838) (pdf)

“We understand the person who offers the excuse to mean that he did what he did only because he was unable to do otherwise, or only because he had to do it” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 838) (pdf)

–

“a person is not morally responsible for what he has done if he did it only because he could not have done otherwise.” (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 838) (pdf)

Determinism

“conjunction of these two theses: (a) For every instant of time, there is a proposition that expresses the state of the world at that instant. (b) If A and B are any propositions that express the state of the world at some instants, then the conjunction of A with the laws of physics entails B.” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 186) (pdf)

II

III

“I shall now imagine a case in which a certain man, after due deliberation, refrained from performing a certain contemplated act. I shall then argue that, if determinism is true, then that man could not have performed that act” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 190) (pdf)

“the seventh of which follows from the first six:

1. 1. If determinism is true, then the conjunction of PO and L entails P. (Po * L) —> P (J doesn’t raise his hand at T)
2. 2. If J had raised his hand at T, then P would be false.
3. 3. If (2) is true, then if J could have raised his hand at T, J could have rendered P false.7
4. 4. If J could have rendered P false, and if the conjunction of PO and L entails P, then J could have rendered the conjunction of PO and L false. (remember the alaska example: (Q * R), S —> ~R, ~R —> ~(Q * R), therefore S —> ~(Q * R), but (Q * R) v ~(Q * R), does ~(Q * R) = ~R?
   “The Spanish Armada was defeated in 1588. and Peter van Inwagen never visits Alaska.” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 192) (pdf)

5. 5. If J could have rendered the conjunction of PO and L false, then J could have rendered L false.
6. 6. J could not have rendered L false.
7. 7. If determinism is true, J could not have raised his hand at T.

“. Let us suppose there was once a judge who had only to raise his right hand at a certain time, T, to prevent the execution of a sentence of death upon a certain criminal, such a hand-raising being the sign, according to the conventions of the judge’s country, of a granting of special clemency. Let us further suppose that the judge - call him ‘J’ refrained from raising his hand at that time, and that this inaction resulted in the criminal’s being put to death.” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 190) (pdf)

“Let us examine the premises individually. (1) This premise follows from the definition of determinism. (2) If J had raised his hand at T, then the world would have been in a different state at T from the state it was in fact in. (See our second condi

“And, therefore, if J had raised his hand at T, some contrary of P would express the state of the world at T. It should be emphasized that ‘P’ does not mean ‘the proposition that expresses the state of the world at T’. Rather, ‘P’ denotes the proposition that expresses the state of the world at T. In Kripke’s terminology, ‘P’ is being used as a rigid designator, while ‘the proposition that expresses the state of the world at T’ is perforce non-rigid.8” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 192) (pdf)

> “principle: If S can render R false, and if Q entails R, then S can render Q false.” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 192) (pdf)

IV

“And since these criteria make no mention of determinism, anyone who thinks that free will and determinism are incompatible is simply confused.9 As regards the argument of Part III (this philosopher might continue), this argument is very complex, and this complexity must simply serve to hide some error, since its conclusion is absurd. We must treat this argument like the infamous ‘proof’ that zero equals one: It may be amusing and even instructive to find the hidden error (if one has nothing better to do), but it would be a waste of time to take seriously any suggestion that it is sound. Now I suppose” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 194)

“determinism are incompatible is simply confused.9 As regards the argument of Part III (this philosopher might continue), this argument is very complex, and this complexity must simply serve to hide some error, since its conclusion is absurd. We must treat this argument like the infamous ‘proof’ that zero equals one: It may be amusing and even instructive to find the hidden error (if one has nothing better to do), but it would be a waste of time to take seriously any suggestion that it is sound. Now I suppose” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 194) (pdf)

• III is absurd, contains an error that is not worth it to discover

–

“. And the only difference I can see between this argument and the ‘criteria’ argument for the compatibility of free will and determinism is that predestinarianism, unlike determinism, is obviously incompatible with free will” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 195) (pdf)

???

• Lots of disagreement here that is quite interesting:

“is. To say of some person on some particular occasion that he acted freely is obviously to say at least that he acted on that occasion.” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 195) (pdf)

???

• infer agency as a criteria for action

• focus on desires and intentions etc

“the form: (8) S could have done X mean is: (9) If S had chosen to do X, S would have done X.12” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 196) (pdf)

–

• we could deny the laws of physics as we know them (happens)

\[ \begin{array}{} \text{you} \rightarrow \lnot \text{ gold chains} & \text{(if I have you, then I can't have gold chains)} \\\ \lnot \lnot \text{ gold chains} & \text{(not gold chains is not an option)} \\\ \therefore \lnot \text{you} & \text{(ya gots ta go)} \end{array} \]

???

Post Malone turns this on its head however. This is something I need to explore in the near future. Apparently, a common theme in Greek tragedy is to show good people being ruined ‘because of things that just happen to them’ [@nuss01a, 25]. How does this ruin come about? The ruin is often a choice an individual is forced to make. The choice is typically horrific. An example of such a choice is found in Aeschylus’s Agamemnon. Here, Agamemnon is faced with a dilemma resulting from two contradictory divine demands. Agamemnon must sacrifice his daughter, ‘\(\lnot\) you’, to appease the goddess Artemis in order to exact vengeance on behalf of Zeus, ‘gold chains’. Because the material conditional, ‘you \(\rightarrow\) \(\lnot\) gold chains’ is equivalent to the disjunct ‘you \(\lor\) gold chains’, this can also be expressed the following way: ‘\(\lnot\) you \(\lor\) \(\lnot\) gold chains. Here Agamemnon chooses ’gold chains’ (‘\(\lnot\) \(\lnot\) gold chains’), sacrificing his daughter resulting in \(\lnot\) you.

We can see the equivalence using a truth table:

##   (you) (¬ gold chains) (you → ¬ gold chains) (you ∨ gold chains)
## 1     T               F                     F                   F
## 2     T               T                     T                   T
## 3     F               F                     T                   T
## 4     F               T                     T                   T

???

However, it is not the choice that is reprehensible here, rather it is the ease with which Agamemnon makes the choice. In other words, Agamemnon is not ruined by his choice.

Agamemnon’s Reprehensible Attitudes

he adopted an inappropriate attitude towards his conflict, killing a human child with no more agony, no more revulsion of feeling, than if she had indeed been an animal of a different species [@nuss01a, 33]

???

Ethically speaking then, Agamemnon’s downfall was the fact that he wasn’t ruined by the choice.

Many rap songs are tragic in this sense, where the rapper is not ruined by the choice he or she is forced to make. In other words, ‘\(\lnot\) you’ is often chosen with ease. However, we are not often dismayed at the choices rappers are forced to make in this regard. Perhaps rappers like to parody Greek tragedies in this sense, if true, then Rich and Sad is a parody of other parodies.³

It doesn’t have to be however. Perhaps it is plausible that ‘\(\lnot\) gold chains’, is not an option for Post and therefore we’re left with ‘\(\lnot\) you’. Perhaps his significant other has already left before he made his millions. He can try drowning his sorrows with his significant wealth, but is unsuccessful in doing so. Still either way, Post chooses the path less taken in rap songs where ‘\(\lnot\) you’ leaves him with feelings of regret. I think that this is something we do not often see in rap, earning Rich and Sad a place in the Makarios a Solitary.

If you do read the lyrics, I would like to apologize for the explicit language and subject matter.