Freewill-Continued-Again


The incompatibility of Freewill and Determinism

Peter Van Inwagen

???

“In this paper I shall define a thesis I shall call ‘determinism’, and argue that it is incompatible with the thesis that we are able to act otherwise than we do (i.e., is incompatible with ’free w” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 185) (pdf)

“s. The reader may think of them as functions from possible worlds to truth-values or in any other way” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 185) (pdf)

van inwagen raises his hand at t_1, pw at which vi hand is raised == t

“.g., they are either true or false; the conjunction of a true and a false proposition is a false pro” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 185) (pdf)


“If it is raining, then I wear my coat” — “If I don’t wear my coat, then it isn’t raining.” The law of contraposition says that a conditional statement is true if, and only if, its contrapositive is true.

  • deny the consequent, ask whether the denial of the antecedent follows

  • A —> B; ~B —> ~A

“Our definition of ‘determinism’ will also involve the notion of ‘the state of the entire physical world’ (hereinafter, ‘the state of the world’) at an instan” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 185) (pdf)

would imply other truths, a world in which vani’s hand is raised could also be a world where a frog in a pond sings the blues

“(i) Our concept of ‘state’ must be such that, given that the world is in a certain state at a certain time, nothing follows logically about its states at other time” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 186) (pdf)


“that Jones’s left hand will be raised 10 seconds later than t.” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 186) (pdf)

we do not imply that if world is x at t_1, then at t_2 world is y

“If there is some observable change in the way things are (e.g., if a white cloth becomes blue, a warm liquid cold, or if a man raises his hand), this change must entail some change in the state of the wo” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 186) (pdf)

“ld. That is, our concept of ‘state’ must not be so theoretical, so divorced from what is observably true, that it be possible for the world to be in the same state at t1 and t2, although (for example) Jones’s hand is raised at t1 and not att2.” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 186) (pdf)


Determinism

“conjunction of these two theses: (a) For every instant of time, there is a proposition that expresses the state of the world at that instant. (b) If A and B are any propositions that express the state of the world at some instants, then the conjunction of A with the laws of physics entails B.” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 186) (pdf)


An initial worry

avoiding tautologous statements? why important?

focus on state of the world at some time plus the laws of physics and not absent them.

As such, between times 1 and 2, there will be a given change in the state of the world that is dependent on the laws of physics.


Law of physics

not reducible to laws of nature since these include voluntary actions (psychological laws), would deny rational agency

“word. I am using ‘law of physics’ in the way some philosophers use ‘law of nature’.” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 187) (pdf)

“. I will not use the term ‘law of nature’, because, conceivably, psychological laws, including laws (if such there be) about the voluntary behavior of rational agents, might be included under this term.1 Rational agents are, after all, in some sense part of ‘Nature’” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 187) (pdf)


Law of physics:

I am using ‘law of physics’ in th eway some philosophers use ‘law of natue’

  • law about chemical valences = law of physics

  • but not psychological laws


But this does not tell us what laws of nature are.

  • what are the necessary and sufficient conditions of a law of nature?

  • necessary conditions:

    • a condition that necessarily must occur or be present
  • sufficient

    • a condition, that were it present

Some possibilities
  • not a proposition unless true and contingent (there are mountains on the far side of the moon, I can either pursue a relationship or money but not both etc)

  • not a proposition if proposition entails the existence of some concrete individual (law of nature == it is necessary for Cesar to exist)

  • law of nature must support its counterfactuals


  • Dogs die if exposed to virus V

  • equivalent to: Every dog is such that if it were exposed to virus V, it would die

  • quantifies over past, present, and future dogs

  • imagine a breeder breading an immunity to virus V into dogs (counter example)

  • this would undermine “every dog is such that if it were . . .”

  • so “dogs die if exposed . . .” is not a law of nature


I do not think that any philosopher has succeeded in giving a (non-trivial) set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a proposition’s being a law of nature or of physics

???

While no philosopher has attempted an analysis for the necessary and sufficient conditions of ‘law of physics’, any such analysis would take into account “any analysis on which these claims did not come out true”


II


Freewill

  • power or ability of agents to act otherwise than they in fact do.

  • freewill ==assertion that what one does, is what is in their power to do.


Can

“. But, as I said I should do in the case of ‘law of physics’, I shall make certain conceptual claims about ‘can’ (in the ‘power’ or ‘ability’ sense) in the absence of any analysis” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 189) (pdf)

“S can render [could have rendered] … false.” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 189) (pdf)

“where ‘…’ may be replaced by names of propositions.5 O” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 189) (pdf)


  • we are not told what those conditions are, but we can imagine what they might be.

  • Let’s imagine that the last true prop spoken by Plato was “the planets behave erratically”

  • then let’s imagine that Aristotle discovered that the planets in fact obey the laws of physics and so do not behave erratically.

  • therefore Aristotle rendered the last true prop spoken by Plato false

???

“He could have reached Chicago by midnight. as He could have rendered the proposition that he did not reach Chicago by midnight false. an” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 189) (pdf)

“under what conditions the last true proposition asserted by Plato (i.e., that proposition having as one of its accidental properties, the property of being the last true proposition asserted by Plato) would be false, and then discover whether it was within Aristotle’s power to produce these conditions” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 190) (pdf)


  • now we imagine that Aristotle had it within his power to determine how the planets behave

  • therefore Aristotle could not have rendered the last true prop …

???

“On the other hand, if the last true proposition asserted by Plato is the proposition that the planets do not move in perfect circles, then Aristotle could not have rendered the last true proposition asserted by Plato false, since it was not within his power to produce any set of conditions sufficient for the falsity of this propositio” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 190) (pdf)


III

“I shall now imagine a case in which a certain man, after due deliberation, refrained from performing a certain contemplated act. I shall then argue that, if determinism is true, then that man could not have performed that act” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 190) (pdf)

“the seventh of which follows from the first six:


    1. If determinism is true, then the conjunction of PO and L entails P. (Po * L) —> P (J doesn’t raise his hand at T)
    1. If J had raised his hand at T, then P would be false.
    1. If (2) is true, then if J could have raised his hand at T, J could have rendered P false.7
    1. If J could have rendered P false, and if the conjunction of PO and L entails P, then J could have rendered the conjunction of PO and L false. (remember the alaska example: (Q * R), S —> ~R, ~R —> ~(Q * R), therefore S —> ~(Q * R), but (Q * R) v ~(Q * R), does ~(Q * R) = ~R?
    “The Spanish Armada was defeated in 1588. and Peter van Inwagen never visits Alaska.” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 192) (pdf)

    1. If J could have rendered the conjunction of PO and L false, then J could have rendered L false.
    1. J could not have rendered L false.
    1. If determinism is true, J could not have raised his hand at T.

“. Let us suppose there was once a judge who had only to raise his right hand at a certain time, T, to prevent the execution of a sentence of death upon a certain criminal, such a hand-raising being the sign, according to the conventions of the judge’s country, of a granting of special clemency. Let us further suppose that the judge - call him ‘J’ refrained from raising his hand at that time, and that this inaction resulted in the criminal’s being put to death.” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 190) (pdf)


“Let us examine the premises individually. (1) This premise follows from the definition of determinism. (2) If J had raised his hand at T, then the world would have been in a different state at T from the state it was in fact in. (See our second condi


“And, therefore, if J had raised his hand at T, some contrary of P would express the state of the world at T. It should be emphasized that ‘P’ does not mean ‘the proposition that expresses the state of the world at T’. Rather, ‘P’ denotes the proposition that expresses the state of the world at T. In Kripke’s terminology, ‘P’ is being used as a rigid designator, while ‘the proposition that expresses the state of the world at T’ is perforce non-rigid.8” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 192) (pdf)


> “principle: If S can render R false, and if Q entails R, then S can render Q false.” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 192) (pdf)

Some Example cases

    1. Nothing ever travels faster than light.
    1. Jones, a physicist, can construct a particle accelerator that would cause protons to travel at twice the speed of light.” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 193) (pdf)

  • either A is not a law of Physics

  • or Jones cannot construct a particle accelerator . . .

  • but what if Jones doesn’t have the resources for B?

  • then B = F (but conceptually possible)

“. Let us suppose that Jones’s ability to render (A) false derives from the fact that he has discovered a mathematically rigorous proof that under certain conditions C, realizable in the laboratory, protons would travel faster than light. And let us suppose that this proof proceeds from premises so obviously true that all competent physicists accept his conclusion without reservation. But suppose that conditions C never obtain in nature, and that actually to produce them in the laboratory would require such an expenditure of resources that Jones and his colleagues decide not to carry out the experiment.” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 193) (pdf)

“but it would be a waste of time to take seriously any suggestion that it is sound.” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 194) (pdf)


IV


“And since these criteria make no mention of determinism, anyone who thinks that free will and determinism are incompatible is simply confused.9 As regards the argument of Part III (this philosopher might continue), this argument is very complex, and this complexity must simply serve to hide some error, since its conclusion is absurd. We must treat this argument like the infamous ‘proof’ that zero equals one: It may be amusing and even instructive to find the hidden error (if one has nothing better to do), but it would be a waste of time to take seriously any suggestion that it is sound. Now I suppose” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 194)

“determinism are incompatible is simply confused.9 As regards the argument of Part III (this philosopher might continue), this argument is very complex, and this complexity must simply serve to hide some error, since its conclusion is absurd. We must treat this argument like the infamous ‘proof’ that zero equals one: It may be amusing and even instructive to find the hidden error (if one has nothing better to do), but it would be a waste of time to take seriously any suggestion that it is sound. Now I suppose” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 194) (pdf)


  • III is absurd, contains an error that is not worth it to discover

“. And the only difference I can see between this argument and the ‘criteria’ argument for the compatibility of free will and determinism is that predestinarianism, unlike determinism, is obviously incompatible with free will” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 195) (pdf)

???

  • Lots of disagreement here that is quite interesting:

“is. To say of some person on some particular occasion that he acted freely is obviously to say at least that he acted on that occasion.” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 195) (pdf)

???

  • infer agency as a criteria for action

  • focus on desires and intentions etc


“the form: (8) S could have done X mean is: (9) If S had chosen to do X, S would have done X.12” (Van Inwagen, 1975, p. 196) (pdf)

  • we could deny the laws of physics as we know them (happens)

\[ \begin{array}{} \text{you} \rightarrow \lnot \text{ gold chains} & \text{(if I have you, then I can't have gold chains)} \\\ \lnot \lnot \text{ gold chains} & \text{(not gold chains is not an option)} \\\ \therefore \lnot \text{you} & \text{(ya gots ta go)} \end{array} \]

???

Post Malone turns this on its head however. This is something I need to explore in the near future. Apparently, a common theme in Greek tragedy is to show good people being ruined ‘because of things that just happen to them’ [@nuss01a, 25]. How does this ruin come about? The ruin is often a choice an individual is forced to make. The choice is typically horrific. An example of such a choice is found in Aeschylus’s Agamemnon. Here, Agamemnon is faced with a dilemma resulting from two contradictory divine demands. Agamemnon must sacrifice his daughter, ‘\(\lnot\) you’, to appease the goddess Artemis in order to exact vengeance on behalf of Zeus, ‘gold chains’. Because the material conditional, ‘you \(\rightarrow\) \(\lnot\) gold chains’ is equivalent to the disjunct ‘you \(\lor\) gold chains’, this can also be expressed the following way: ‘\(\lnot\) you \(\lor\) \(\lnot\) gold chains. Here Agamemnon chooses ’gold chains’ (‘\(\lnot\) \(\lnot\) gold chains’), sacrificing his daughter resulting in \(\lnot\) you.

We can see the equivalence using a truth table:


##   (you) (¬ gold chains) (you → ¬ gold chains) (you ∨ gold chains)
## 1     T               F                     F                   F
## 2     T               T                     T                   T
## 3     F               F                     T                   T
## 4     F               T                     T                   T

???

However, it is not the choice that is reprehensible here, rather it is the ease with which Agamemnon makes the choice. In other words, Agamemnon is not ruined by his choice.


Agamemnon’s Reprehensible Attitudes

he adopted an inappropriate attitude towards his conflict, killing a human child with no more agony, no more revulsion of feeling, than if she had indeed been an animal of a different species [@nuss01a, 33]

???

Ethically speaking then, Agamemnon’s downfall was the fact that he wasn’t ruined by the choice.

Many rap songs are tragic in this sense, where the rapper is not ruined by the choice he or she is forced to make. In other words, ‘\(\lnot\) you’ is often chosen with ease. However, we are not often dismayed at the choices rappers are forced to make in this regard. Perhaps rappers like to parody Greek tragedies in this sense, if true, then Rich and Sad is a parody of other parodies.1

It doesn’t have to be however. Perhaps it is plausible that ‘\(\lnot\) gold chains’, is not an option for Post and therefore we’re left with ‘\(\lnot\) you’. Perhaps his significant other has already left before he made his millions. He can try drowning his sorrows with his significant wealth, but is unsuccessful in doing so. Still either way, Post chooses the path less taken in rap songs where ‘\(\lnot\) you’ leaves him with feelings of regret. I think that this is something we do not often see in rap, earning Rich and Sad a place in the Makarios a Solitary.


If you do read the lyrics, I would like to apologize for the explicit language and subject matter.



Conclusion

Xaringan is a nifty Rstudio add-on/package for creating HTML presentations.

  • I think I’m still more inclined toward Beamer but Xaringan has tons of flexibility.
  • Have an interactive component to your presentation (e.g. leaflet or a Shiny app)? You probably want Xaringan.

Plus, you can put GIFs into your presentation with Xaringan. That’s nifty. Maybe students will like that.


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Questions? Hate mail? Stay out of my mentions @stevenvmiller


  1. But this is beside the point↩︎